SAUSSER v. STEINMETZ.
From the happening of the accident, in
the absence of sufficient explanatory circumstances, some kind of negligence
may well be presumed, and unless explained, may well be held to create a
liability. Mullen v. St. Tohn, 57 N. Y.
567 (1874). And see Kearney v. London, -c., Railroad Co., Law Rep. 5 Q.
B. 411 ; affirmed in the Ex. Ch., 6
Q. B. 759 (1878) ; Byrne v. Bradle, 2
H. & C. 722; ScOtt v. London Dock Co.,
3H. & C. 596.
So, in Shipley v. Fifty Associotes,
106 Mass. 104 (1870), it was held, following Fletcher v. Rylands, that if a
person maintains a building on his land,
with a roof so constructed, that snow
and ice collecting on it from natural
causes, will naturally and probably fall
into the adjoining highway, he is liable,
without other proof of negligence, to a
person injured on the highway by such
fall of snow, without fault on his part.
See also Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 238
(1878). So, if a person, in blasting
rocks on his own land, causes fragments
thereof to be thrown on to the land and
buildings of another, he is liable, without any other proof of negligence, if

that be necessary, than the act itself:
ay v. Cohoes Co., 2 Comst. 159, 163.
The principle involved in this case
of Crowhurst v. The Amersham Burial
Board, seems to have governed a very
recent case in the Common Pleas decisions, which was not apparently cited.
There the plaintiff and defendant owned
adjoining lands, separated by a wire
fence which the defendant erected, and
was bound to maintain. From long exposure, the strands of the wires composing the ropes of the fence decayed, and
pieces of it fell to the ground on the
plaintiff's side, and lay hidden in the
grass. The plaintiff's cow, lawfully
grazing there, swallowed a piece of the
wire about eight inches long, and died
in consequence.
The defendant was
held liable for the value of the cow:
Rirth v. Bowling Iron Co., 3 C. P. Div.
254 (1878). And see Humphriesv. Cousins, C. P. Div. 239.
In view of the somewhat conflicting
opinions on this subject, it seems safe to
say that the precise limits of the doctrine
of sic utere tuo ut alienum non lWdas, may
not yet be definitely determined.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
B. F. SAUSSER v. DANIEL STEINMETZ.
A parol agreement to lease for more than three years being within the Statute
of Frauds, it is not a fraud for one party to refuse to execute it.
An action lies for the breach of such agreement, but the damages recoverable
are such only as result directly from the breach. Nothing can be recovered for th6
loss of the bargain,, nor is the rent named in the proposed lease admissible as a
measure of the damages.
In the absence of evidence that the lessor was prevented from leasing to another
person, and no claim being made for money expended in improvements or repairs,
made specially necessaryby the proposed lease, his damages must be merely nominal.

TnIs was an action brought by the lessor defendant in error,
for the breach of a parol contract to lease a store for five years.
The special count of the declaration alleged the agreement to lease;
the alterations and improvement of the premises by the plaintiff
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in accordance with the contract; his willingness to lease and his
tender of the keys and of possession of the premises, and his offer
to execute a lease in accordance with the contract. It also alleged
the refusal by the defendants to take the premises and pay the rent,
and averred that the property remained unoccupied, and that the
plaintiff suffered loss through the expense of the alteration and loss
in general owing to the failure of the defendant to take the property. The defendant filed two pleas: 1. That there was a mutual
rescission of the contract. 2. The Statute of Frauds.
The evidence, so far as the Statute of Frauds was concerned,
was to the effect that the plaintiff, Steinmetz, offered an unsigned
lease, which the defendant, Sausser, was unwilling to sign, and
thereupon new negotiations took place between the parties, and
that at a later period Sausser, the defendant, tendered a lease
which Steinmetz refused to execute; that the negotiations were
then discontinued, and that, shortly afterwards, Steinmetz sent
the keys and a letter to defendant, offering to execute the lease
"as agreed upon ;" that Sausser persisted in his refusal, and that
the property was not let until a year had passed.
Among other points presented by the defendant to the court
below for the charge to the jury was the following, which was
refused: "1The plaintiff not claiming damages by reason of the
alterations and improvements mentioned, and there being no evidence of any other specific damages sustained, should your verdict
be for the plaintiff, the damages to be assessed can only be nominal
damages." And the court, inter alia, charged the jury as follows:
"Now in this case a, gentleman had leased his property for $2000,
and, by the violation of the contract, he did not receive a dollar,
and you might consider that the $2000 represents the amount of
injury that he sustained, if, as he tells you, he advertised and was
only able to rent his place at the end of the year, and you may
take that as a measure of damages if you wish." There was a verdict for the plaintiff for an amount about equivalent to one year's
rent under the contract, with interest, &c.
B. T. _Fisher, for plaintiff in error.-" Tender must be made of
a lease or deed :" Brown v. Metz, 5 Watts 164; Smith v. Webater, 2 Id. 478. " Damages cannot be recovered for loss of the
bargain :" Bowser v. Cessna, 12 P. F. Smith 149; HIuberv. Burke,
11 S. & R, 238; Southerlandv. rurry,2 P. & W. 145; E4a77 v.
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Harris, 20 P. F. Smith 174; Thompson v. Sheplar, 22 Id. 160;
.Ewtng v. Tees, 1 Binn. 450; McNair v. Crompton, 11 Casey 28;
Meason v. Kaine, 17 P. F. Smith 126; McClowry v. Croghan'8
Administrators, 7 Casey 22; Burr v. Todd, 5 Wright 213;
-Dumars v. Miller, 10 Casey 819 ; Hertzog v. Hertzog, Id. 418;
Ewing v. Thompson, 16 P. F. Smith 388; Bender v. Bender, 1
Wright 419; Asheom v. Smith, 2 P. & W. 211.
A lease for more than three years comes within the same ruling
of the Statute of Frauds as contracts for sale of land: MTc~owry
v. Croghan'sAdministrator,7 Casey 23; Burr v. Tod, 5 Wright
213; Bowser v. Gessna, 12 P. F. Smith 148; .Ellet v. Paxon, 2
W. & S. 433.
The mere refusal to fulfil a contract invalid under the Statute
of Frauds is not such fraud as that the court will take the case out
of the statute therefor: Harris v. Harris, 20 P. F. Smith 170;
22 Id. 163 ; Buckert v. -Domenee,2 W. N. C. 195.
The measure of damages in an action by the vendee against the
vendor for the breach of a. parol contract of a sale of land is the
amount of purchase-money paid with interest and expenses; if no
purchase-money has been paid, then the expense and trouble incurred by the vendee in procuring a title; but he cannot in the absence
of fraud recover damages for loss of the bargain: lDumars v. Miller, 10 Casey 819; Hertzog v. Hertzog, 10 Id. 418; Bender v.
Bender, 1 Wright 419; Haines v. O'Connor, 10 Id. 320; MNair v. Compton, 11 Casey 23; Twill v. Granger, 8 N. Y. (4
Seld.) 115; Newbrough v. Walker, 8 Grattan R. (Va.) 18; Sand8
v. Arthur, 4 W. N. C. 502.
Joseph R. Bhoad, for defendant in error.-The tender of a Ieed
or lease signed is not necessary when the action is not on the lease,
but for a breach of a parol contract to lease. Tender of a deed
or lease is not necessary when the vendee has refused to accept:
Tinney v. Ashley, 15 Pick. 546, 552; Weaver v. Zimmerman, 3
W. N. C. 56; .Hampton v. Speckenagle, 9 S. & R. 222.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GORDON, J.-It would appear from the evidence in this case that
some time in the fall of 1871 B. F. Sausser, representing himself
and his copartners, made a parol agreement with Daniel Steinmetz,
the plaintiff below, to lease for the term of five years from the 1st
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of January then 'next following, certain premises on North Fifth
street, in the city of Philadelphia. Steinmetz agreed to make certain alterations in the premises required and deemed necessary by
Sausser in order properly to fit them for the business the defendants proposed to carry on therein. According to the finding of the
jury the plaintiff performed his part of the agreement, but the defendants were in default in that they refused to execute the lease.
For the breach of this oral contract this suit was brought, and in
discussing the measure of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled, the court below charged: "Now in this case a gentleman had
leased his property for $2000, and by the violation of the contract
he did not receive a dollar, and you might consider that the $2000
represents tle amount of injury that he sustained, if, as he tells
you, he advertised and was only able to rent his place at the end
of the year, and you may take that as a measure of damages if you
will."
The serious fault in this instruction is, that it is based on a false
premise; the plaintiff had not leased his property. The proposed
lease was within the Statute of Frauds, hence the parol agreement
to lease could give it no force, and, to predicate anything whatever
of that intended lease was error. Either party had the right to
refuse its execution, and the defendants were guilty of no fraud in
availing themselves of such right. Neither party could plead ignorance of the statute, and hence both are presumed to have known
that either might take advantage of its terms ; and that the defendants did avail themselves of that privilege cannot be regarded as a
fraud on the plaintiff: Harrisv. Harris, 20 P. F. Smith 170.
What these parties had was but an agreement to lease, and
although for the breach of such an agreement, according to Weaver v. Wood, 9 Barr 220, an action will lie, yet necessarily the
damages recoverable are such only as result directly from such
breach.
What then is the true measure of damages in this case ? Not the
amount of the proposed rent, for that, by the statute, the plaintiff
is not entitled to; neither can it be used for such measure, for the
lease itself being fbr a greater term than three years, is void, and
so cannot be used for any purpose whatever. He could not recover
for the loss of his bargain, for on authority this is not allowable:
Dumarsv. .zl7er, :LO Casey 819. It does not appear that in consequence of the agreement with the defendants Steinmetz was pre-
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vented from leasing to some other party, for at that time be had no
other offer, and so it would seem that unless he was indaced by his
contract with the defendants to so alter the premises as to unfit
them for ordinary purposes, or to*put work upon them which was
unnecessary for their improvement or repair, he has suffered no
injury from the breach complained of, and his damages are but
nominal.
If the rule, submitfed by the court to the jury, is to obtain,
then may a contract void -by the statute be specifically enforced.
Says the learned judge, you may measure the damages by the amount
of the proposed rent; the premises, notwithstanding the efforts of
the landlord to get a tenant, have remained unoccupied for one year,
so you may assess damages at one year's rent; but of course the
same rule must apply had the premises under like condition remained unoccupied for the whole term of five years. But this was
all there was of the parol contract; when the rent is paid the contract is fulfilled on the part of the lessee, and therefore there is a
specific execution of it. By the same rule you might enforce a,
parol contract for the sale of land and so annul the Statute of Frauds
and Perjuries altogether, a result not allowable either in reason ox
oeOlowry v. Olog an, Admr's, 7 Casey 22; Wilson
on authority:
v. Clark, 1 W. & S. 554.
It follows that as the case stood in the court below the defend.
ant's first point should have been affirmed, since the plaintiff having
proved no actual damage resulting from the breach of the contract
to lease, was entitled only to a judgment for nominal damages.
This disposition of the eighth specification, renders comment on
the remaining exceptions unnecessary.
Judgment reversed, and a new venire ordered.
The foregoing case is one which indicates with clearness what is the scope
of the application of the Statute of
Frauds of Pennsylvania to contracts for
the sale or lease of lands? The decision as to the measure of damages,
assuming the contract not to comply
with the statute, is sustained by all the
law that had ever been laid down on the
subject in this state, and the action being
for a breach of a parol contract to
lease, the Statute of Frauds did not
apply in any other relation.

Both in the above case and in Sands
v. Arthur, 84 Penn. St. 479, there was
doubt on the facts as to whether the deed
or lease as tendered was in accordance
with the parol contract, when of course
the deed, &c., would be no compliance
with the Statute of Frauds : this consideration was, however, of no importance in the above case of Sausser v.
Steinmetz, because the action was for a
breach of a parol contract, the lease having never been properly executed, and
the memorandum offered by the plaintift
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below being manifestly insufficient as
a compliance with the statute: and
in Sands v. Arthur, the decision was
not rested in any way on the point as to
whether the deed was in accordance with
the contract or not. The expression of
opinion contained in the decision of the
Supreme Court in Sausser v. Steinmetz,
that neither party in that case was bound,
was of course correct, the lessor never
having signed or tendered a writing or
deed properly executed under the first
section of the Statute of Frauds ; the decision leaves entirely untouched, then,
the important question how far the lessor if he had executed and tendered a
sufficient memorandum or lease could or
could not have recovered the entire consideration of the contract? This question is of much interest and is in great
doubt. It had been supposed (Leading
Cases in Equity, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 1093;
865
1 Whart. on Ev., 1st ed., p. 103,
and 866, and 16 Am. Law Reg. 642)
that this question in one aspect at least
was definitely settled by the case of
Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Penn. St. 426,
Judge STRONG giving the opinion of
the court. There have, however, been
three cases since opposed to this, namely:
Meason v. Kaine, 67 Penn. St. 130 ;
Sands v. Arthur, 84 Id. 479, and if the
phrase in the opinion in Sausser v.
Steinmetz, to the effect that either party
has a right to refuse the execution of a
contract relating to land, means that the
vendee can set up the statute as well as
the vendor ; and the remark of the court
is not to be regarded as qualified by the
facts of the actual case before it, then
we must add Sausser v. Steinmetz, to
these decisions and dicta inconsistent
with Tripp v. Bishop. Not one of these
cases it may be noted takes any notice
of Tripp v. Bishop, not even Sands v.
Arthur, which probably overruled it.
In Tripp v. Bishop, it was decided that
the vendor was not prevented from recovering on the equitable ground of
there being a want of mutuality of

remedy, and l'ilson v. Clark, in which
Judge GIBsoN brought forward the doctrine of mutuality, was distinguished.
(See 16 Am. Law Reg. 642.) But in
M.ason v. Kaine, supra, it was suggested
that the doctrine of mutuality did apply
in this connection and in Sands v. Arthur,
the rule of mutuality was made the
foundation of the decision in which the
plaintiff was held not to recover.
The only point of difference between
Tripp v. Bishop and Sands v. Arthur,
consisted in the fact that in Tripp v.
Bishop, the conveyance tendered by the
plaintiff the vendor had been accepted
by the vendee ; while in Sands v. Arthur
this acceptance was refused ; in neither
case did the court lay any stress on the
point of acceptance or non-acceptance.
To settle this question, not merely must
the scope of the doctrine of mutuality
be determined, but also the force and
effect of an acceptance as distinguished
from a mere tender, and the further
question considered how far a vendee is
at all within the Statute of Frauds in
Pennsylvania.
Now if a vendor who has tendered a
deed or executed a memorandui properly signed, &c., and who sues for the
purchase-money, is to fail in his action,
it must be for one or more of the following three reasons : 1. Because the
vendee has not, in compliance with the
Statute of Frauds, signed a deed or
memorandum tendered by the vendee.
2. Or because a deed or memorandum
tendered by the vendor has not been
accepted by the vendee. 3. Or because
of want of mutuality of remedy.
As to the first, it will be shown that
under 29 Car. II., such signature by the
vendee may be necessary, and that if
the acceptance of a deed is a substitute
therefor, It must be on the ground that
no action at law for the purchase-money
lies until the legal title is vested in the
vendee by a deed delivered and accepted,
and that therefore if such signature bythe
vendee is necessary, it is because equity
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will not specifically enforce the contract
against the vendee unless the latter, as
being the party to be charged under j 4
of 29 Car. II. has signed a memorandum : but that if a deed is delivered
and accepted, the title being vested, the
action for the purchase-money lies at
law irrespective of the Statute of Frauds.
Further, it will be seen that under the
Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds, the 4th
section being not in force, equity will
not protect a -vendee on the ground
that he has not signed; that the vendor signing and tendering a deed has
complied with the statute : and that,
as in Pennsylvania, an action at law lies
on an equitable title, a conveyance accepted giving a legal title, is not a prerequisite to a suit. As to the second point,
it will be shown that if an acceptance
of the deed tendered by the vendor is
requisite, it is not so on the ground that
such acceptance is required by the Statute of Frauds, which says or suggests
nothing of the sort, but as has been said,
is only of consequence, when owing to
the rule that equity will not, under the
4th section of the Statute of Frauds,
specifically enforce the contract against
him, there is no other remedy except
the one at law against the vendee, who
by acceptance of the deed has the legal
title vested in him; and that in Pennsylvania the 4th section not being in
force, equity could not, if the 1st section of the statute has been complied
with by a deed signed and tendered by
the vendor, refuse specific performance,
owing to the absence of a memorandum
signed by the vendee; and, further, that
an action at law lying on the equitable
title, no decree in Pennsylvania for specifioperformance is necessary. As to the
thirdpoint, it will be shown that if the
plaintiff is ready to bind himself to performance of his part of the contract, as
the vendor does by tender of a deed,
there is no reason to apply the equitable doctrine of mutuality, which would
have been relevant in case of a comVOL. XXVIL--46

plainant against whom in future a decree would for any reason have been
impossible. And even if an original
want of mutuality cannot thus be dispensed with by tender, &c. ; and if the
absence of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, with its peculiar phraseology, "the party to be charged,'
leaves the doctrine of mutuality (which
on the strength of these words has in
England been held not to apply to cases
under the statute) to pre'ail in Pennsylvania in fall force, then the execution of a deed or memorandum at any
time before action, being a full compliance with the statute by the vendor,
there is no failure of remedy as against
him.
I. The application generally of the
Statute of Frauds to the vendee of land.
To state these propositions at greater
length, we have following. The 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, requiring
a contract for the sale of land to be in
writing and signed by the party to be
charged, &c., was deliberately omitted
from the Pennsylvania Statute of
Frauds. And if the addition of the 4th
section of the Statute of Frauds was
regarded as necessary to protect the
vendee of land, it is a strong argument
that the words of the 1st section were'
insufficient for that purpose, and the deliberate omission of the 4th section from
the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds, is
a proof that vendors only were to be
protected by the statute, and that a
parol contract is sufficient to bind a
vendee to the payment of the purchasemoney. The 1st section, which was
retained, requires, in order that the title
to the land should pass, that a writing
signed by the party making or creating
the estate should be executed.
It has been settled in Pennsylvania
that parol contracts for the sale of lands
are valid so far as they do not pass the
title in the land, to accomplish which a
compliance with the first section of the
Statute of Frauds is necessary. Therefore
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a vendee can be held, so far as any provision of the Statute of Frauds requiring
an instrument or writing on his part is
concerned, if the vendor has, in compliance with the first section, signed a
writing, &c.
If where section 4th is in force is meant
by the party to be charged the party
defendant in the action, no action will
lie in law or equity for the purchasemoney where a memorandum has not
been signed by the vendee. And, therefore, if such action will lie against a vendee who has not signed, but who has
accepted a deed, we have a manifest exception to the general rule for which we
must account : ride infra. If, on the other
hand, the 4th section of the Statute
of Frauds is not in force, or by the
party to be charged is meant only the
vendor (the statute protecting landed
interests only), then the vendee can be
held on a parol contract for the sale of
land if the vendor has signed a memorandum or executed a deed in accordance with the first section. Whether
such deed or memorandum must be accepted by the vendee is next to be considered.
II. The necessity of tender by the vendor, or of tenderby the vendor and acceptonce by the vendee of a writing signed,
4-c., in compliance with section first of
the Statute of Frauds. As a preliminary
matter it is to be ascertained on: what
ground an action for the purchasemoney will lie when a deed has been
accepted by the vendee who has not
complied with the rule, supposing it to
be such, under 4th section of the Statute
of Frauds, requiring a memorandum
signed by him.
If the vendee has accepted the deed
the legal title at common law passes.
And it cannot now be contended that
an action for purchase-money will not
lie on parol evidence against a vendee,
who is the holder of the legal title, on
the part of a vendor whose property he
has, because- this is not enforcing any

contract relating to land, or in any way
affecting the title. If the contract is
not fully executed by the vesting of the
title in the vendee, but remains executory, and the aid of equity is necesary,
the state of the case is different. Fox
if no legal title is vested in the vendee
by a conveyance accepted, and the vendor cannot sue at law on an equitable
title, the latter must first establish his
title.in equity, and have a legal title
decreed to be made before he can recover the purchase-money. But where
the contract is executory, and requires
enforcing, equity may hold, and has
held in Efigland that under the 4th
section it will require a written memorandum signed by the vendee, inasmuch as such vendee is clearly a party
who is being sought to be charged,
and the interest is one relating to land,
inasmuch as the title has not yet been
executed under the contract. Where
the title has been so executed by a conveyance, the vendor's bill would be dismissed, as he could not require the aid
of equity, having a ripe claim at common law, irrespective of the Statute of
Frauds, for the money consideration.
As in Pennsylvania, the 4th section
is not in force, specific performance
in equity could not be refused on the
ground that the vendee had not signed
a memorandum, &c. And an action at
law lying upon the equitable title in
Pennsylvania it is not necessary, apart
from the statute, that the acceptance by
the'vendee of the conveyance should be
decreed before the action will lie. Now
the next question is, whether such acceptance is necessary under the statute,
or generally is it necessary in any way
to perfect the equitable title I
If where a deed is accepted the action
lies against the vendee for the purchasemoney, it must be because either (1)
the statute requiring a memorandum
signed by the party to be charged has
been complied with; or (2) because
such tender and acceptance is equi-hlo
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part performance; or (3) because the
transaction is fully performed by the
tender and acceptance ; or (4) because
the transaction being for purchasemoney and not for land, the statute
does not apply, as not protecting in this
connection the liability for the purchasemoney merely. The first of these reasons cannot be the one for the acceptance of the deed is an act in pais and
provable by parol, and therefore no
compliance with the enactment requiring a memorandum signed by the party
to be charged. The vendee under the
4th section of the statute being regarded
in equity as the party to be charged, and
therefore the one whose signature is necessary. It is not for the second reason,
because equitable part performance goes
on the ground of fraud, and says where
the vendee has taken possession of the
land or has spent money upon it, that a
refusal of the legal title is a fraud on
the vendor's part. It must therefore be
for one or both of the remaining reasons, i. e., that the contract is fully executed so far as the statute is concerned,
by the vesting of the title to the land in
the vendee by his acceptance of the
deed, and because the statute does not
apply to the suits for the purchasemoney merely.
When, therefore, a title in the land,
such as the law recognises, either legal
or equitable, is vested in the vendee, an
action for the purchase-money will lie
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds.
Now in Pennsylvania there is no provision of the Statute of Frauds requiring
the vendee to, sign a memorandum, and
a compliance with the first section by
the vendor will vest a good equitable title in the vendee. Equity, therefore, if the first section has been complied with, will if necessary, order the
legal title to be perfected. If equity
dismisses a bill on such an occasion, it
would only be on the ground that an
action at law for the purchase-money will
lie in Pennsylvania on an equitable title,

and that this is an adequate remedy.
The next question is, what is a compliance with the first section of the Statute
of Frauds.
A vendor only in Pennsylvania need sign the writing or deed,
and a parol contract for the sale of land
between the vendor and vendee has
always been held valid, when it did not
have the effect of passing the title in
land. Therefore, if the vendee, &c.,
is not to be held when the deed or writing has been executed by the vendor,
it must be on the ground that the law
requires a tender of such deed or writing
by the vendor, or both a tender by the
vendor and acceptance by the vendee.
A deed or writing must be tendered, if
tender is necessary, on the ground that
while tender may be a mere ceremony
when the vendee has announced his
intention not to accept the deed, &c.,
yet that tender is a -usual and proper
mode of satisfying the court that such
execution of a deed or writing as the
statute requires, has taken place, and
because a deed, &c., executed and kept
by the vendor, is not to be recognised by
the law as existing at all; non-execution or execution unknown to the law
not satisfying the requirements of the
statute.
Whether such tender must be made
before aettion brought is a distinct question not now taken into consideration.
An acceptance can only be necessary
on the ground that without it no equitable title passes, for if an equitable title
passes, the remedy at law can be had
either directly, as in Pennsylvania, or
can be furnished by a proper decrce in
equity. An acceptance of deed or
writing to give an equitable title if
necessary is so, either as required by
common law or by the Statuteof Frauds.
A. At common law an equitable estate
or use or trust can be created or transferred by parol, under a contract upon
a sufficient consideration, neither deed
or writing accepted or unaccepted being
required. When chancery before the
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Statute of Frauds was passed required have been hnund at common law, is not
bound by his parol contract, for which
a written memorandum, this was in
favor of vendors only, so as not to pass a signed writing or deed is tendered
him, yet he is bound in equity by anland upon verbal evidence. B. Under
the Statute of Frauds, acceptance must " other parol act, viz., the acceptance of
be necessary either (1) as required ex- the deed or writing. It has been shown
pressly or by plain deduction from the that the acceptance of a deed is valid to
bind the vendee, and take the case out
general language of the statute, or (2)
as being necessary to constitute a writ- both of the 1st and 4th sections of the
ing, signed by the party making or creat- Statute of Frauds, not because such
ing the estate, which is required by sect. acceptance is required by the statute,
I of statute, oron the ground that by this but because this vests a legal title at
section, not merely a writing, but a common law in the vendee, and the latdeed is required, and a deed to be such, ter, though he is the party sought to be
must be delivered and of delivery ac- charged, is no longer even under section
four protected from an action on a parol
ceptance, is an essential feature.
I. There is no suggestion of this re- agreement to pay the purchase-money ;
quirement in the express language of the and where therefore no such acceptance
statute. As to the second consideration, is necessary at common law to pass an
It is clear that while to charge a party equitable title, and such title has vested
who is within the statute, a writing must by the contract without any such achave been executed by him and accepted ceptance, it is not to be supposed that
by the other ; because, if the plaintiff by inference the statute intended to
had refused the writing, it would indi- make new requirements in the case of
zate on his part a disclaimer of the trans- a party not even remotely referred to
action, and would show if the defendant therein. If the equitable title in Pennsubsequently withdrew his offer that no sylvania therefore is vested in the
meeting of minds had taken place, or vendee, owing to the fact that the 4th
that both parties had refused the con- section does not stand in the way and an
tract; yet, that a defendant who can equitable title can be made the subject
legally bind himself by a parol contract, of an action at law, an action for the
and who having done so can prevent a purchase-money lies as plainly on such
plaintiff who alone is referred to in the a title as it does on a legal title when a
Statute of Frauds from complying with conveyance has been accepted for this
that statute is absurd. There can be no latter lies even when the 4th section has
valid refusal therefore, by the vendee, a not been complied with; the case in
party not within the statute to accept a Pennsylvania is all the stronger, inasdeed or writing signed and tendered by much as the 4th section is not law there
the vendor, the only party affected by at all. Whether the writing signed by
the statute, such tender being a full com- the vendor, &c., under the 1st section of
pliance by the vendor with all that the the Statute of Frauds, the only one restatute required of him, for he cannot lating to land in force in Pennsylvania,
means a memorandum of the agreemake the vendee accept.
It should be said also that a deed not ment only, or whether a writing under
yet made such by being delivered, may seal in the nature of a conveyance is
yet be a full compliance with the Stat- required, is the question which, so far
ute of Frauds. If the above proposi- as what instrument is necessary to pass
tions are incorrect, then the statute by the legal title, has been decided in New
implication substitutes one parol act for Jersey and other states in favor of reanother; while a vendee who would quiring a conveyance, while illogically
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perhaps, it has been assumed in Pennsylvania that a mere writing signed,
though not sealed, will pass the equitable title from the vendor to the vendee.
The argument is, however, strong that
the statute did not relax any requirement of the common law, but in addition to these required by its first section
a deed (except in the case of lease where
it has been held not without doubt that
a mere writing was enough), and by
the fourth section a writing signed.
It having been held that a writing
signed, though not sealed, is a compliance with the Statute of Frauds in
Pennsylvania, a deed signed and tendered is of course such a memorandum,
and will pass the equitable title, though
as it is not delivered it does not pass
the legal title, and though acceptance
being part of delivery, acceptance is
necessary to pass the legal title, and
though a deed if it were required by the
first section to pass the equitable title
would have to be accepted to be a deed.
It is believed therefore that any rule
laid down by the courts requiring evidence of the acceptance by the vendee
of the writing signed by the vendor,
while expedient possibly as satisfying
the court, is not called for by any rule
of law. The vendee is bound by his
original parol contract, and the vendor
by executing and tendering a deed or
writing complies with every requirement of the first section of the Statute
of Frauds, since that section has been.
held in Pennsylvania not to require
a deed.
III. The Doctrine of Mutuality of
The doctrine of mutuality
Remedy.
of remedy in equity does not apply
when the plaintiff tenders full performance of his part of the contract, because
the reason of the rule is that should the
plaintiff's prayer be granted, it may not
be possible to afterwards compel the
plaintiff to fulfil his obligation to the
defendant, and if the plaintiff disposes
of this difficulty by tendering perform-

ance of his part, there is no substantial
ground left for the objection, especially
as the whole matter lies in the chancellor's discretion.
In the present case the plaintiff does
this when he tenders a deed signed by
him. Therefore the defendant, the
vendee, under a parol sale of land, cannot refuse, on this plea of mutuality, to
pay the purchase-money when the vendor
so tenders the deed.
If on the other hand, the doctrine of
mutuality is wider than this, and is not
disposed of by the tender of performance and negatives in every case, a recovery, if the remedy were unilateral
in the original contract, and is not satisfied by the removal of this feature
through an offer of performance by the
plaintiff who voluntarily performs that
which he could not have been compelled
to perform; and if the memorandum,
as is settled law, need not be executed
at the time of the contract made; and
the law in Pennsylvania requires no
signature to any deed or writing on the
part of the vendee. Then a vendor at
any time may sign a memorandum or
execute a deed, and having thus complied with the law, the vendee's parol
contract being sufficient under the Statute of Frauds, there is complete mutuality of right and remedy. Conclusion.
The result of all this is, that in every
case a lessor or vendor in Pennsylvania
under a parol contract, if he makes
or tenders a deed or writing signed,
can recover the purchase-money, even
though acceptance be refused by the
vendee, inasmuch as the latter is bound
by his parol contract which is valid for
all purposes except to pass title, and as
the title is passed by the vendor's compliance with the 1st section of the Statute of Frauds.
Whatever doubt ttbere may be as to
the necessity of acceptance by the vendee, there can be no doubt that the
doctrine of mutuality does not apply
in this connection, and that no execa-
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tion of any deed or writing is required
on the vendee's part. Sands v. Arthur,
therefore, if to be supported, must be so
on a ground not taken by the Supreme
Court that, viz., of non-acceptance by
the vendee of the deed or writing tendered by the vendor. And the remark
in Sausserv. Steinmetz, that either party
may decline to carry out a parol contract relating to land must be confined
to the facts in the particular case, where
the vendee had failed to comply with
the statute; if not so qualified this doc-

trine can only be correct where the
vendee has refused to accept. In other
words, Sends v. Arthur must be rested
on the doubtful basis of non-acceptance
or be regarded as bad law, and the general remark in Sausser v. Steinmetz, be
limited to the cases where the vendor
has not tendered a deed or writing, or
be extended at the furthest to those
where although the vendor has tendered
a deed or writing, the vendee has
refuied to accept it.
H. R.

Supreme Court of the United States.
THE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY v. THE PEOPLE.
The expression in a constitution or statute exempting from taxation property,
"necessary for school purposes," is more extensive than "for the use of schools."
The former includes property which is not itself in actual use by the school, but
which by being rented produces an income that is applied to the support of the
school.
The fourth section of the Amendatory Charter of 1855, of The Northwestern
University, provides "that all property of whatever kind or description belonging
to or owned by said corporation shall be for ever free from taxation for any and
all purposes." Sect. 3,art. 9, of the state constitution of 1848, of Illinois, in
force when said amendment was made, provided that "the property of the state and
counties, both real and personal, and such other property as the General Assembly
may deem necessary for school, religious and charitable purposes may be exempted
from taxation." Sect. 3, art. 9, of the state constitution of 1870, provided that
"the property of the state, counties and other municipal corporations, both real
and personal, and such other property as may be used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and charitable
purposes, may be exempted from taxation; but such exemption shall be only by
general law;" and the revenue act of 1872, passed thereunder, exempted "all
property of institutions of learning, including the real estate on which the institutions are located, not leased by such institutions or otherwise used with a
view to profit." The Supreme Court of Illinois in this case, held (80 II. 330) :
That the above-quoted section of the constitution of 1848 did not authorize the
exemption from taxation of property owned by educational, religious or charitable
corporations, which was not itself used directly in aid of the purposes for which
the corporations were created, but which was held for profit merely, notwithstanding the profits were to be devoted to the proper purposes of the corporation.
Upon error to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, that, the language of
the constitution of 1848, being, that the legislature might exempt from taxation
" such property as they might deem necessary," not for the use of schools, but" for
school purposes," land/held by the university for sale or lease, the profits to be
devoted to the use and support of the university, were held for school purposes
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within the meaning of the constitution of 1848 : that this construction necessarily

becomes a part of the legislative contract made by the Amendatory Act of 1855,
and that said act having been accepted by the university, and investments made
on the faith of it, the obligation of the legislativg contract thereby completed was

impaired by the provisions of the constitution of 1870, and the revenue act of 1872,
above quoted, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois was amcordingly
reversed.
ERROR to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
in the opinion.

The facts are stated

Wirt -Dexteraud M. Carpenter, for plaintiff in error.

James K .Edsall and

. H. Willett, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-This isa writ of error to the Supreme Court of
Illinois, bringing before us a judgment of that court, holding that
certain property of the plaintiffs was liable to taxation, which was
resisted on the ground that it was exempt by a legislative contract.
The university was incorporated by an act of the legislature of
Illinois, approved January 28th 1851, which contained the powers
necessary to its usefulness as an institution of learning, and among
other provisions, authorized it to purchase and hold real estate to the
extent of two thousand acres of land, and receive gifts aid devises of
land above that amount, which must be sold within ten years. In
1855 the legislature, by an amendment to this charter, appointed
three additional trustees and enlarged its powers in some respects
not very important. But the fourth section of that act is the one
supposed to contain the contract on which this case must be decided.
It reads thus: "That all property of whatever kind or description
belonging to or owned by said corporation shall be for ever free from
taxation for any and all purposes." The state constitution of 1848,
in force when the charter and amended charter above cited were
enacted, declared that "the property of the state and counties, both
real and personal, and such other.property as the General Assembly
may deem necessary for school, religiods and charitable purposes, may
be exempt from taxation." The record shows a very large list of lots
and lands in Cook county, which the plaintiff asserted to be free
from taxation under the law, but which were listed for the taxes of
the year 1874, and about to be sold for their non-payment. By
proper judicial proceedings the question came before the Supreme
Court of the state, which held that they were liable to be so taxed.
A motion was made some time before the case was reached for
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argument in this court, to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction, and
was overruled ; but the attorney-general of Illinois reserves the
objection now in connection with the main argument. This question of jurisdiction to reverse the judgments of state courts is so
frequent, and the principles which govern it so well settled, that we
need not be very elaborate in our opinion on that point. The
argument is that the judgment of the state court is limited to a construction of the fourth clause of the amendatory charter of 1855, as
it is affected by the constitution under which it was enacted, and
that whether that statute was a contract or not, and whether it was
properly construed or not, it is still but the decision of a court construing a contract or a statute, and there is no law of the state
impairing the obligation of that contract within the meaning of the
constitution of the United States. If this were true in point of
fact the conclusion would be sound, as we have repeatedly held in
this court: Railroad Co. v. Bock, 4 Wall. 177 ; Railroad Co. v.
MicClure, 10 Id. 511 ; Knox v. Exchange Bank, 12 Id. 879. But
the premises assumed are not justified by the facts. The general
revenue law of Illinois, prior to the amendment of 1855 to plaintiff's charter, contained nothing which exempted its property from
taxation. When that act was passed it became a part of the law
of the state governing taxation as applicable to the property of the
university. The law remained in this condition until the state
adopted a new constitution in 1870, the part of which relating to
this subject is in these words: "The property of the state, counties, and other municipal corporations, both real and personal, and
such other property as may be used exclusively for agricultural and
horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and charitable
purposes, may be exempted from taxation, but such exemption shall
be only by general law."
In order to conform the law of the state on the subject of taxation to this provision of the new constitution, the legislature revised
its revenue laws in 1872, and in this statute the exemption established was, first, all lands donated by the United States for school
purposes not sold or leased, all public school-houses, all property
of institutions of learning, including the real estate on which the
institutions are located, not leased by such institutions or otherwise
used with a view to profit; second, all church property actually and
exclusively used for public worship, when the land (to be of reasonable size for the location of the church building) is owned by the

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY v. THE PEOPLE.

congregation. It was under this law the local officers proceeded
in assessing plaintiff's land for taxation, and it was their construction of this law which was sustained by the Supreme Court. If,
therefore, the legislation of 1855 was a contract which exempted
the property in question from taxation, and by the law of 1872, as
construed by the Supreme Court, it is held liable to taxation, it is
manifest that it is the law of 1872 and the constitution of 1870
which impairs the obligation of the contract, however the court by
an erroneous construction of that contract, was led to hold otherwise. It is strenuously insisted that these provisions of the constitution of 1870 and the revenue law of 1872 do not repeal the exemption as established by the 4th section of the amended charter of
1855, because that section was in excess of the authority conferred
by the constitution of 1848. But this depends on the construction
of that contract as affected by the constitution under which it was
enacted. If, by virtue of that constitution, the legislature of that
day could only exempt plaintiff's real estate so far as it was in immediate use for school purposes, as was held by the Supreme Court,
then it may not repeal that statute or impair that contract, for the
exemption will probably amount to the same thing under either
statute. But if it is a contract, as is contended by plaintiff's counsel, which, under a true construction of the constitution of 1848
exempts all property of plaintiff which is held by it for appropriation to the purposes of the university as an institution for teaching,
and which is held for no other purpose whatever, and which can as
effectually promote this purpose by leases, of which the rent goes
to support the school, as in any other way, then the law of 1872
and the constitution of 1870 do, to the extent of the difference arising from these two constructionsimpair the obligation of the contract
of 1855. Whether that contract is such as to be impaired by these
later laws is one of the questions of which this court always has
jurisdiction: Jefferson Cbunty Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436;
Bridge Proprietorsv. Hfoboken, 1 Wall. 144 ; Delma8 v. Insurance Co., 14 Id. 668.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in its opinion found in the record
appears to concede that the Act of 1855, to the extent that it was
authorized by the state constitution, was a contract. "It is not
claimed," says the court, "that the appellant is in any sense a
public corporation, but it is claimed that the purpose for which it
is created is so far beneficial to the public that it affords a sufficient
VoL. XXVIL--47
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consideration for the grant of exemption from taxation in the
amendment, and that when the amendment was accepted and acted
on by the corporation, it must be held a vested right which cannot
be withdrawn by subsequent legislation because of the provision of
the constitution of the United States which prohibits a state from
passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract. If it was
competent for the General Assembly to make the exemption, we are
not disposed to contest the correctness of this position, but if it was
not competent. to make the exemption, the attempt was a nullity,
and the case is not affected by the constitution of the United
States." The court thus concedes that there was a contract, so far
as the legislative powers extended. It is possible if that question
had been fully investigated and all the facts necessary to decide it
were before the court, it might not appear that all the lands subjected to taxation by the judgment of the Supreme Court were
bought after the date of the amended charter or donated on the
faith of that exemption; but it does appear, by a stipulation made
for that purpose, that since the granting of said amended charter
the corporation has-expended in the erection and purchase of buildings, apparatus and other facilities and appliances for education and
promotion of the objects stated in and contemplated by the act of
incorporation, over $200,000, realized from donations and the sale
of lots and lands, and has built up a university, with several departments of learning, in which more than five hundred students are
taught the higher branches of learning. It is perhaps a fair inference from this statement, and in deference to the ruling of the Supreme Court, that there was such acceptance of this Act of 1855,
and such investments made on the faith of it, that at least some portion of the property now in question is protected by contract if the
exemption clause lawfully covers it. It will readily be conceded
that the language of the fourth section of the Act of 1855 is
broad enough for that purpose: "All property, of whatever kind
and description, belonging to or owned by said corporation, shall
be for ever free from taxation for any and all purposes." But
the argument is that since the constitution then in force only permitted the legislature to exempt from taxation the property, real.
and personal, used by the university in immediate connection with
its function of teaching, the statute must be limited to property so
used. This was the view taken by the Supreme Court of the state.
"By the language of the constitution," says the court, "while a
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Jiscretion is conferred on the General Assembly whether to exempt
or not, and, if it shall determine to exempt the amount of the
exemption, it is clearly restricted in the exercise of this discretion
to property for schools and religious and charitable purposes. Property for such purposes, in the primary and ordinary acceptance of
the term, is property which in itself is adapted to and intended to
be used as an instrumentality in aid of such purposes. It is the
direct or immediate use and not the remote or consequential benefit
to be derived through the means of the property that is contemplated."
Though the court is here construing the constitution of its own
state, and is therefore entitled to, our consideration on that ground,
as well as the court's character and standing for learning and
ability, we find ourselves in the performance of the duty of reviewing this case, compelled to differ from that court in the nature and
extent of the constitutional limitation of this contract, as made by
the legislature of the same state; for this constitution necessarily
becomes part of the contract which is said to be impaired by subsequent legislation. The first observation we have made is that
the constitution does not say "property used for schools," as the
opinion of the court implies. Neither the important word "use"
or "schools" is found in the third section of the instrument on
that subject. If the language were that the legislature might
"exempt property for the use of schools" we should readily agree
with that court. Indeed, that would be the appropriate language
to convey the idea on which the court rests its decision. The
makers of the constitution, however, used other language because
they had another meaning, and did not use that because they did
not mean that. They said that the legislature might exempt from
taxation "such property as they might deem necessary," not for
the use of schools but "for school purposes." The distinction is,
we think, very broad between the property contributing to the
purpose of a school made to aid in the education of persons in that
school, and that which is directly or immediately subjected to use
in the school. The purposes of the school and the school itself are
not identical. The purpose of a college or university is to give
youth an education. The money which comes from the sale or
rent of land dedicated to that object aids this purpose. Land so
held and leased is held for school purposes in the fullest and clearest sense. A devise of a hundred acres of land "to the president
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of the university for the purpose .of the school," would be not only
a valid conveyance, but if the president failed to- do so a court of
chancery would compel him to execute the trust; but if he leased
it all for fair rent and paid the proceeds into the treasury of the
corporation to aid in the support of the school, he would be supported as executing the trust. When the constitution, in 1870,
came to be reconstructed, its framers had learned something about
exemption from taxation, as we shall see by placing the revision in
that constitution alongside that of 1848 on the same subject, as
follows: 1848-" The property of the state and counties, both real
and personal, and such other property as the General Assembly may
deem necessary for school, religious and charitable purposes may
be exempt from taxation." 1870-"The property of the state,
counties and other municipal corporations, both real 'and personal,
and such other property as may be used exclusively for agricultural
and horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery and
charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation. But such
exemption shall be only by general law." Here it is only such
property as may be exclusively used for school purposes that may
be exempt, and this only by a general law. The general law
passed in 1872, to give effect to this change in the constitution,
exempted only "the real estate on which the institutions of learning
are located, not leased by such institutions or otherwise used with
a view to profit." This is what the Supreme Court say was meant
by the constitution of 1848, but if it was it took a deal of change
in the language when the framers of the new constitution and of
the new tax law came to express the same idea. We cannot come
to the conclusion that they intended to mean the same, but that the
later law was designed to limit the more enlarged power of the
earlier one. If our construction of the constitution of 1848 is
sound, the judgment of the Supreme Court must be reversed, for
the stipulation of facts on which the case was tried says, that "it is
admitted that all the lots and lands mentioned and described in the
objections filed in said proceeding for judgment, whereon said taxes
are levied, excepting improvements in the same, are leased by said
university to different parties for different parties for a longer or
shorter period, and that all said lots and lands are held for sale or
lease for the use and support of said institution, and the objects
contemplated by said charter." We are of opinion that such use
and such holding bring them within the class of property which
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by the constitution of 1848, the legislature could, if it deemed
proper, exempt from taxation, and that the legislature did so
exempt it. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the state is
reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice

STRONG

did not sit in this case.

The importance of the principal case
in its bearing upon the property interests of educational, charitable and religious corporations in the state of
Illinois, can hardly be over-estimated ;
but while the friends of higher education and of the institution of learning
whose interests are involved in this
ease, can not but rejoice at the conclusion arrived at by the learned court,
it will not, it is hoped, be regarded as
presumptions to examine some of the
cases heretofore decided, and state some
of the principles therein laid down, bearing upon the general topic of exemptions from taxation, with a view to examining the grounds of this decision.
It is settled that charters of incorporation, except in the case of municipal
corporations, constitute contracts between the 'state and the corporators,
the obligation of which may not be
impaired by legislative action alone, unless the right so to do is reserved by the
state, either in the charter or by statutory or constitutional provision. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat.
518; Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How.
301; T4ustees of Vincennes University v.
Indiana, 14 Id. 268; &otland Co. v. M.,
L 4- N. Railway Co., 65 Mo. 123 ;
Cooley's Const. Lim. 126, 279, and cases
there cited; Burroughs on Taxation
109.
It is also settled upon the authority
of the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, that a state may
by contract to that effect, founded upon
a consideration, exempt the property of
an individual or corporation from taxation for any specified period, or even

permanently, and also, as it seems, that
where a charter containing an exemption from taxes or an agreement that
the taxes shall be to a specified amount
only, is accepted by the corporators, the
exemption is presumed to be upon sufficient consideration, and consequently
binding upon the state. Cooley's Const.
Lim. 12, 280; Cooley on Taxation 53;
Blackwell on Tax Titles 407 ; Gordon
v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; New
Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164; Piqua
Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369;
Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt, 16 Id. 432;
Dodqe v. Woolsey, 18 Id. 331: Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Debolt, 18
Id. 381 ; Mechanics' and Traders' Bank
v. 7 Xonas, Id. 384; Jefferson Branch
Bank v. Skelly, I Black 436; Erie
Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall.
492; Scotland Co. v. M., L 4- N. Railway Co., supra. See, however. the last.
proposition of the above rule criticised
in Burroughs on Taxation 116, where
the subject of the consideration necessary
is fully considered. See, also, Cooley
on Taxation 54; Tucker v. Ferguson,
22 Wall. 527; West Wis. Railroad Co.
v. Supervisors, 93 U. S. 595.
The rule that a state may by contract
preclude itself from the future exercise
of the right of taxation, though, as
above stated, settled upon authority,
has, however, met with strenuous opposition at the hands of some of the state
courts and of the dissenting judges of
the Supreme Court of the United States.
See Toledo Bank v. Bond, 1 Ohio St.
622 ; Mechanics' 6- Traders' Bank v.
Debolt, Id. 591 ; Knoop v. Piqua Bank,
Id. 603; Milan, 4-c., Plank Road Co.
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v. Husted, 3 Id. 578 ; PiscataquaBridge
v. N. I1.Bridge, 7 N. H. 69; Brewster
v. Hlough, 10 Id. 143 ; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 Id. 24 ; Thorpe v. R. 4- B. Rlailroad Co., 27 Vt. 140; Brainardv. Colchester, 31 Conn. 410; Afott v. Penna.
Railroad Co., 30 Penn. St. 9; East
Saginaw Salt Manufacturing Co. v. East
Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259; 11Vest Wisconsin Railroad Co. v. Supervisors, 35 Wise.
265 ; Attorney-General v. Chicago, 4-c.,
RailroadCo., Id. 572 ; IVashington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 441, per MILLER, J.; Blackwcll on Tax Titles 408 ;
Burroughs on Taxation 109, et seq.
And were the question now to arise
for the first time, it would deserve great
consideration whether upon principle it
ought not to be settled otherwise. See
the authorities last above cited. The
general rule unquestionably is, as stated
by Blackstone (I BI. Com. 90), that
" Acts of Parliament derogatory to the
power of subsequent Parliaments, bind
not." With reference to the same subject, Judge COOLEY, in his learned

work on Constitutional Limitations (p.
283), says: "It would seem, therefore, to be the prevailing opinion, and
one based upon sound reason, that the
state cannot barter away, or in any
manner abridge or weaken, any of
those essential powers which are inherent in all governments, and the existence of which in full vigor is important to the well-being of organized
society ; and that any contracts to that
end, being without validity, cannot be
enforced because of any supposed conflict
with the provision of the national constitution now under consideration (with
reference to laws impairing the obligation of contracts). If the tax cases are
to be regarded as an exception to this
statement, the exception is, perhaps, to
be considered a nominal rather than a
real one, since taxation is for the purpose of providing the state a revenue,
and the state laws which have been enf"rced as contracts in these cases have

been supposed to be based upon consideration, by which the state receives the
benefit which would have accrued from
an exercise of the relinquished power in
the ordinary mode." See also Cooley's
Const. Lim. 125 ; Cooley on Taxation
52.
It is believed that it is beyond the
power of the legislature to alienate the
police power of the state, even by express grant, and even though the grant
is founded upon a consideration. See
"horpe v. R. 6- B. Railroad Company,
27 Vt. 149, per REDFIELD, C. J. ;
Cooley's Const. Lim. 283, and cases
there cited. And also that by the better
opinion, the legislature cannot by contract or grant preclude itself from the
future exercise of the right of eminent
domain.
See Cooley's Const. Lim.
281, 282, and authorities there cited.
If any comparisons were to be instituted
as respects their relative importance to
the existence and well being of the government of a state, between the police
power or the right of eminent domain on
the one hand, and the right of taxation
on the other, it would certainly not be
unfavorable to the latter, without the exercise of which neither of the former
powers could be exercised. And upon
principle, it is believed that no distinction whatever can be made between an
alienation of the one, and an alienation
of the other, and that both, unless in
terms authorized by the constitution,
ought to be held equally opposed to
public policy and void.
As respects the argument above quoted
from Cooley's Const. Lim., that in the
tax cases, the contracts are supposed to
be based upon consideration, &c., it is
believed that this affords no satisfactory
grounds for the exception. In nearly,
if not quite, all the cases of exemption by legislative contract founded on
an alleged consideration (the cases of
exemptions of the property of school
charitable and religious corporations
may be supported on other grounds
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viz., of public policy), such consideration will, so far as it is available for
purposes of revenue, the great object of
taxation, be found to be illusory, and
at best merely nominal, and as the legislature must be the judges of the adequacy of the consideration offered,
grounds of public policy would seem
sufficient to warrant the total denial of
their right to exercise so dangerous a
power, unless authorized, and then only
to the extent authorized by the constitution under which they are elected. See,
however, Scotland Co. v. M., L g- N.
RailroadCo., 65 Mo. 123, where it was
held that the taxing power may he alienated by contract, where there is no
constitutional provision inhibiting it;
also cases cited, ante.
Conceding then, that it is settled by
authority that a state may by contract
founded on a consideration, preclude
itself from the exercise of the right of
taxation upon property of an individual
or corporation, we come to the consideration of some of 'he rules by which
grants of exempreon are to be construed.
Taxation being the rule, and exemption from taxation the exception, the
rule is well settled that statutes creating exemptions from taxation should be
strictly construed, and not be extended
beyond their terms. The intention to
exempt must, in order to be effectual,
be expressed in clear and unambiguous
terms. Every presumption is against
the exemption: Burroughs on Taxation 113, 132; Cooley on Taxation
54, 146; Cooley on Const. Lim. 281,
note; 514, note; Blackwell on Tax
Titles 409. These principles are illustrated by a large number of cases
too numerous to be here cited, but which
will be found collected by the authors
above referred to. As an example, the
rule may be stated that, although the
power to levy a special assessment can
only be justified as an exercise of the
taxing power: Cooley on Taxation

147, 148; People v. Mayor, 4-c., of
Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419 ; State v. Mayor,
4-c., of Newark, 35 N. J. Law 168;
Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495 ; Weeks
v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242 ; Glascow v.
Rouse, 43 Mo. 489 ; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 ; Emery v. Gas Co., 28
Id. 346; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wrood
Co., 8 Ohio St. 333; Prayv. N~orthern
Liberties, 31 Penn. St. 69; Baltimore v.
Cemetery Co., 7 Md. 517 ; .McComb v.
Bell, 2 Minn. 295 ; it is well settled
that an exemption of property from taxation in general terms, will not be held
to exempt it from special assessments
for local improvements. See matter of
Mayor, 4-c., of N. Y. 11 Johns. 77;
Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N.
Y. 506 ; City of Patterson v. Society, 24
N. J. Law 385 ; Northern Liberties v. St.
John's Church, 13 Penn. St. 104; Broadway Baptist Church v. feAtie, 8 Bush
508; Second Universalist Society v.
Providence, 6 R. I. 231 ; Baltimore v.
Cemetery Co., 7 Md. 577 ; Le Fevre v.
Detroit, 2 Mich. 586 ; First Presbyterian
Church v. Fort Wayne, 36 Ind. 338 ;
Canal Trustees v. Chicago, 12 I1. 403 ;
St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26
Mo. 468 ; La Fayette v. Orphan Asylum,
4 La. Ann. I; Boston Seamen's Friend
Society v. Boston, 116 Mass. 181 ; Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo.
155.
In Baltimore v. Cemetery Co.,
supra, the terms of the exemption were
from 41any tax or public imposition
whatever," but this was held not to exempt the cemetery from an assessment
for paving the street in front of the
Buffalo City Cemetery v.
premises.
Buffalo, supra, is even stronger. In
that case the exemption was in terms
from "all public taxes, rates and assessments," and yet this was held not
to apply to a municipal assessment to
defray the expenses of a local improvebeing
ment, the adjective "public"
considered as applying to the nouns
"rates," and "assessments," as well as
to the noun "taxes."

See also Patter.
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son v. 53ciety, supra; State r*.Neu'ark, 27
N. J. Law 185; Bridgelport v. V. Y. 4. H. Railroad Co., 36 Conn. 255,
where the exemptions were also very
general in their terms. See, however,
Harvard College v. Boston, 104 Mass.
470, where a special assessment for
altering a street, was considered a civil
imposition within the meaning of an exemption of college property from "all
civil impositions, taxes and rates."
Applying the rule that statutes creating exemptions are to be construed
strictly, to the case of educational, charitable and religious corporations employing some portion of their means in
the purchase of property not required
nor directly used for the purposes for
which their corporate privileges were
conferred, though capable of being made
useful and profitable as an aid in their
corporate purposes, the general inclination of the courts seems to be to hold, as
was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the principal case (though, as it
seems, upon an inaccurate view of the
language of the state constitution), that
an exemption of property used or occupied for such purposes would not exempt from taxation property held by
the corporations for mere purposes of
profit, but not used directly for the purposes for which they were incorporated.
See the cases cited by the Supreme
Court of Illinois, when the principal
case was before them, in 80 Ill. 336;
Cooley on Taxation 150, 151 ; Proprietors v. Lowell, 1 Met. 538 ; where an
exemption of " all houses of religious
worship, and the pews and furniture
within the same," was held to exempt
only that part of a building occupied
for religious worship, and not other portions leased for business purposes : Orr
v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86; Tirashburn,College
v. Commissioners, 8 Kan. 344; First Al.
B. Church, v. Chicago, 26 I1. 482 ;
Wyman v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335 ;
Piercev. Cambridge, 2 Cush. 611 ; Kendrick v. Farquar,8 Ohio 189 ; Cincin-

nati College v. The State, 19 Id. 110;
Vail v. Beach, 10 Kan. 214; Aforriso,
v. Larkin, 26 La. Ann. 699 ; Methodist
Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; Detroit
Young Men's Society v. The Mayor of
Detroit, 3 Mich. 172 ; State v. Ross, 24
N. J. Law 497 ; where under a statute
exempting the property of" all colleges,
academies and seminaries of learning,"
the houses and lots provided for the
residence of the president, professors
and stewards, as part of their compensation for their services, were held exempt; but a building owned by the college, and occupied as a grammar school,
by a person paying an annual rent therefor, was held not to be exempt, although
it aided the college incidentally in preparing students for the college.
Indeed, an exemption by statute in
general terms, of all the property of a
college or other literary institution,
seems generally to extend only to property actually used by the institution for
its legitimate purposes. The same rule
seems to have been applied whether the
exemption is in express terms, of such
property only as is used for literary purposes, or whether the terms used are
general; and it seems, that the use
in order to come within the terms of
the exemption, must in either case
be directly in aid of the purposes for
which the corporations were created.
Burroughs on Taxation 134; State v.
Ross, 24 N. J. Law 497 ; State v. Elizabeth, Id. 103; Proprietorsv. Lowell, 1
Met. 538; Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86.
See also, the cases cited next above.
No question was made in the principal case, either in the Supreme Court of
Illinois, or in the Supreme Court of the
United States, but that the words of
the Amendatory Act of 1855, are sufficiently broad to exempt the property in
question, but the question was, whether
the constitution of 1848 authorized the
passage of such an exemption law. In
the principal case the principle that exemptions are exceptional, and therefore
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to be construed strictly, was by the
Supreme Court of Illinois applied to
section 3 of article 9, of the state
constitution of 1848, quoted in the opinion. The Supreme Court of Illinois
appear also, in the printed report of the
case, 80 Ill. 334, 335, to have put their
construction upon a misquotation of the
section in question,which is quoted thus :
"The property of the state and counties,
both real and personal, and such other
property as the General Assembly may
deem necessary for schools, religious
and charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation."
Again, on
page 335 they say: "It [the General
Assembly] is clearly restricted, in the
exercise of this discretion, to property
for schools, and for religious and charitable purposes." It is but just to state,
however, that this error does not appear
to have influenced their decision, for on
page 336 they say: "Houses, furniture, grounds, &c., to be actually used
for educational purposes, may be said to
be for school purposes, &c."
No authority was cited by the Supreme
Court of Illinois, for the proposition,
assumed by the court, that the rule of
strict construction applicable to statutes
in fact creating exemptions, is applicable to a constitutional provision, not
creating an exemption, but authorizing
the exercise of a discretion by the legislature (within certain specified limits),
as to exemptions to be created by the
legislature; and no reason is perceived why, in construing the constitutional provision in question, the
ordinary rules of construction should
not be applicable, and the meaning of
the provision in question be determined
by the fair and natural import of the
terms, and in view of the subject-matter of the provision. From this view of
the case, the distinctioq taken between
the terms "for the use of schools" and
"for school purposes" will doubtless
commend itself to the minds of most
persons. Still it is not so obvious, but
that differences of opinion might well
VOL. XXVIL-48
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exist upon the question, especially in
view of the authorities already cited.
But there is another view of the case
from which the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States seems, to the
writer at least, more satisfactory, and
that is, not as stated by the Supreme
Court of Illinois, that, while a discretion is conferred on the General Assembly whether to exempt or not, and if it
shall determine to exempt, the amount
of the exemption, it is restricted in the
exercise of this discretion to property
for schools, and for religious and charitable purposes, using those terms in the
narrow sense above stated; but that the
intention of the provision clearly was
to confer upon the legislature a broader
discretion, not only as to whether to
exempt or not, and, if they should determine to exempt, the amount of the
exemption, but also if they should determine upon making some exemption, a
discretion to determine for themselves
whether any proposed exemption is
necessary (using that term not in its
strict, narrow sense, but more nearly in
the sense in which it is used in the law
with reference to the power of infants
to contract for necessaries), proper
or appropriate for school purposes, or
the ends to be accomplished by schools,
which involves the determination not
only of the degree of fitness for the purpose, but also to some extent whether or
not the purpose is a school purpose; and,
if in the exercise of their discretion
they determine that the exemption in
question is necessary or appropriate and
proper for the advancement of the object aimed at, the aid of the schools,
their decision, unless clearly evasive
and colorable, is conclusive, and cannot be reviewed by the courts. See
Northwestern University v. The People,
86 Ill. 141, 142, dissenting opinion of
SHELDOx and DiCKEY, JJ.
Whether or not it was wise to give
the legislature so broad a discretion, is
not in issue, but the question is, Did
the constitution of 1848 confer such a
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discretion? and it seems that it did.
Upon the whole then, the decision of
the principal case appears to be correct,
though, as it seems to the writer, it
would have been more satisfactory, had

it also been based on the apparent intention to grant a broader discretion to
be exercised by the legislature, and one
not reviewable by the courts.
MARSHALL D. EBwIL.

SuTpreme Court of Indiana.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY v. SINCLAIR, ADx.
In an action by the administrator of a decedent, against a railroad company, to
recover for the alleged negligent killing of said decedent, by the servants of the
defendant, while running a locomotive and train of cars across a public street
in a populous part of the city, the complaint alleged, that, when the decedent was run over and killed, the defendant was running such locomotive and
train "at a recklessly and grossly negligent and dangerous rate of speed, to wit,
at the rate of forty miles per hour," in violation of an ordinance of such city,
limiting the rate of speed to six miles per hour. Held, it being admitted that the
decedent was guilty of contributory negligence in stepping upon the track in front
of the engine, that evidence that the defendant had wilfully committed the injury
is not admissible under the complaint.
Where an intent, either actual or constructive, to commit an injury exists at the
time of its commission, such injury ceases to be a merely negligent act, and
becomes one of violence or aggression.
Contributory negligence is a complete defence to an action for damages for a
merely negligent injury. It is only when the injury sued for is alleged, in terms
or substance, to have been wilfully committed, that contributory negligence ceases
to be a defence.
THIS was an action by Thomas Sinclair, administrator of John
Sinclair, against the Pennsylvania Company, for damages for killing the said John Sinclair.
The complaint was in two paragraphs.
The first stated, in substance, that, on October 29th 1873, the
defendant was running a train of cars over the track of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway Company, where said
track crosses Fairfield avemie, a public street in the city of Fort
Wayne; that said street was in a populous part of said city, and
was used by persons on foot and otherwise; that, on that day,
while the said John Sinclair was passing along and upon said
street and over said track, with due caution on his part, the defendant, by its servants and agents, so carelessly ran and operated said
locomotive and train of cars, that the same were run upon and over
the said John Sinclair, thereby causing his death.
The second paragraph set out again the same facts substantially,
but averred that the defendant was running said locomotive and
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train of cars "at a recklessly and grossly negligent and dangerous
rate of speed, to wit, at the rate of forty miles an hour," when the
said John Sinclair was run over and killed; that, by an ordinance
of said city, no train of cars was allowed to be run through that
city at a greater rate of speed than six miles an hour; that, by
the same ordinance, it was provided that a watchman should be
kept at the said crossing of said railway and said avenue, to protect persons, passing along said avenue and over said railway track
from danger that might result from passing trains; that the defendant had notice of the passage of said ordinance, but had failed
to comply with the same.
A demurrer to each paragraph of the complaint was overruled,
and the defendant answered in general denial.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, assessing
his damages at one thousand dollars, and judgment followed upon
the verdict.
J.Brackenridge, A. Zollars and F. T. Zollars, for appellant.
B. S.Robertson and L. M.

inde, for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-No question is made in the argument here as to
the sufficiency of the complaint. We, therefore, assume that the
demurrer to it was correctly overruled.
All the questions which we are required to consider are such
as have arisen out of the causes assigned for a new trial by the
defendant after the verdict, and relate principally and almost exclusively to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. * *
(The learned judge here reviewed the evidence.)
We think the evident inference from the evidence is, that the
decedent did not exercise due care in attempting to cross the railway track, as he did when he went upon it, and that he therefore
negligently contributed to the injury which resulted in his death.
It is not insisted by the appellee, that 'the evidence justifies us in
concluding that the decedent was without fault on his'part. The
Terre Haute, ft., Railroad Co. v. Graham, 46 Ind. 239; The St.
Louis, &c., Railway Co. v. Mathias, 50 Ind. 65.
We need not, for that reason, further and more particularly refer
to the evidence tending to establish the want of ordinary prudence
and care on the part of the decedent. Waiving all discussion as to
NIBLACK,
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whether or not the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence,
the appellee contends, that it was shown upon the trial by at least
a fair preponderance of the evidence, that, when the train struck
the decedent, it was running at a rate of speed which, under the
circumstances, amounted to such gross negligence and to such a
wilful disregard of the public safety, and even human life itself, as
to authorize a recovery by the appellee, under the second paragraph
of the complaint, notwithstanding there may have been contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.
Those portions of the evidence which tended to show that, at the
time of the accident, the train was running at a high and dangerous
rate of speed, and that the decedent was struck with great force, are
brought specially to our attention as sustaining that view of the
evidence, but the conclusion at which we have arrived concerning the
nature of. the averments in the second paragraph of the complaint
renders it unnecessary that we shall review that branch of the
evidence.
There is a manifest want of uniformity in the authorities, in their
attempts to define the precise circumstances under which a plaintiff
may recover for an injury, when it is shown that he, by his negligence, contributed to the injury for which he sues, and it is to be
regretted that this want of uniformity pervades some of the cases
heretofore decided by this court, but we think many of the apparent differences which have arisen on this subject result more from
an inapt use of words and phrases than from any difference in the
ideas intended to be expressed. There has been of late a very strong
tendency of judicial opinion, adverse to the distinction between gross
negligence, and ordinary negligence in the sense in which those terms
are used in the class of cases to which we have above referred, and with
that tendency the doctrine has been gaining ground in this, and at
least some of the other states, that something more than mere negligence, however gross, must be shown, to enable a party to recover
for an injury, when he has been guilty of contributory negligence;
that, in such a case, something more aggressive than mere negligence must be alleged and proved. Strictly speaking, negligence
is a non-feasance, not a malfeasance. It is an act of omission
rather than commission. In its secondary meaning, it may be said
to include every omission to perform a duty imposed by law for the
avoidance of injury to a person and property. Where an intention
to commit the injury exists, whether that intention be actual or con-
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structive only, the wrongful act ceases to be a merely negligent
injury, and becomes one of violence or aggression. Shearman &
Redfield's Negligence, sect. 2; Wharton's Negligence, sect. 22, et
8eq.; The Ohio, ft., Railway Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471; Railroad
Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357.
When, therefore, the injury complained of is a negligent one
merely, contributory negligence is a good defence to the action.
It is only when the injury sued for is alleged, either in terms or in
substance, to have been wilfully or purposely committed, that contributory negligence ceases to be a defence. By contributory negligence in this connection, we, of course, mean such negligence as
has materially or substantially contributed to bring about the injury
set up in the complaint. As a matter of evidence, proof that the
misconduct of the defendant was such as to evince an utter disregard of consequences, so as to imply a willingness to inflict the
injury complained of, may tend to establish wilfulness on the part
of the defendant; but, to authorize a recovery on such evidence,
there must be suitable allegations in the complaint to which it is
applicable. The case of The Cincinnati and Martinsville Railroad Co. v. Eaton, 53 Ind. 807, fully sustains the views we have
enunciated in this opinion.
Tested by the rules above laid down, we have come to the conclusion that the second paragraph of the complaint in this case did
not do more than charge a negligent killing of the decedent, and,
hence, that its allegations were not sufficient to justify a recovery
over proof of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.
We are aware that there is a line of decisions establishing what is
known asthe English doctrine, to the effect that the plaintiff may
recover, notwithstanding his own negligence exposed him to the risk
of injury, if the defendant, after becoming aware of the plaintiff's
danger, could, by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have
avoided injuring him: Radley v. .Directors of L. & N. W. Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 App. Cas. 754; Shearman & Redfleld's
Negligence, sect. 86; Wharton's Negligence, sect. 888. But we
do not feel justified in disturbing what has been long accepted in
this state as the better doctrine, after much discussion and consideration.
For the error of the court, in overruling the appellant's motion
or a new trial, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause
remanded, with instructions to grant a new trial and for further
proceedings.
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Court of Appeals of lfaryland.
THIRD NATIONAL BANK OF BALTIMORE v. JOHN H. LANGE.
A trustee has no power to sell trust property for his own use, and one who inys
from him, with actual or constructive notice of the trust, acquires no title.
A promissory note payable to A. B., trustee, is not commercial paper.
The word trustee on the face of the note shows that it was connected with a
trust, and was sufficient to put a purchaser upon inquiry, and, it turning out that
the trustee was selling in fraud of his trust, the purchaser acquires no title.
A subsequent endorser guarantees preceding endorsements, but where the alleged
second endorsement was made before delivery, and the payee subsequently wrote
his name above that of the alleged second endorser, the rule cannot apply, even in
favor of a subsequent bonafide holder without notice, because there was, in fact,
no previous endorsement at the time of the alleged second endorsement.
Parol evidence is admissible to show the character in which the alleged second
endorsers stood towards the note.

THIS was an action on a promissory note by -Flynn & Emrick
"to the order of N. W. Watkins, trustee." The names of N. W.
Watkins, trustee, and J. Regester & Sons were endorsed upon it.
This note was given for the purchase of property sold 1y N.
W. Watkins, as trustee, under a decree of the Circuit Court of
Baltimore city, and was for one of the deferred payments as authorized by that decree. At the time of its delivery to the trustee it
was endorsed by J. Regester & Sons as securities for the drawers-the terms of sale requiring the deferred payments to be secured in
that form.
Subsequently N. W. Watkins wrote above the names of J.
Regester & Sons the endorsement, N. W. Watkins, trustee, and
applied to the Union Banking Company to buy the note, offering
to sell it for 12 per cent. off. The Banking Company not being
willing to buy, its cashier offered to sell it for Watkins, and placed
it in the hands of a bill broker; it was taken by him to the Third
National Bank, the appellant, and offered to it for sale. The bank
bought it from the broker at 9 per cent. off, and the proceeds were
appropriated by Watkins.
.enry Stockbridge, for appellants.-This note is in regular commercial form and came to the appellant in the regular course of
business, from a well-known broker. Appellant had a right to rely
on the last endorsers as a guarantee of the good faith of preceding
ones: 1 Daniel on Neg. Inst., sects. 769, 790, 791, 814; Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E., 870; Goodman v. Simonds, 20
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Howard 843. And see the learned note on this case in Redfield
& Bigelow's Leading Cases on Bills of Exchange 257. Dalrgmple v. Hilenbrand, 62 N. Y. Reps. 5; H~amilton v. Marks, 16
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 42; Commissioners, ft. v. Clark, 4 Otto
285; Collins v. Gilbert, 4 Otto (753), 757-762; Cecil Bank v.
Heald, 25 Md. 563; Haitland v. Citizens' Bank, 40 Md. 540.
Albert .Bitchie, .nchelberger and Clendinen, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRENT, J.-Without intending to decide upon the right of a
national bank to purchase paper (as the question does not necessarily arise in this case), we do not think the note in question is
within the class of paper known as commercial paper, although like
it in general form. The fact that it is payable to the order of
Watkins, trustee, restricts its free circulation, and excepts it from
some of the rules governing commercial paper.
No doctrine is better settled than that a trustee has no power to
sell and dispose of trust property for his own use and at his own
mere will. One who obtains it from him, or through him, with
actual or constructive notice of the trust, can acquire no title, and
it may be recovered by suitable proceedings for the benefit of the
cestui que trust. If there are circumstances connected with the
purchase which reasonably indicate that trust property is being
dealt with, they will fix upon the purchaser notice of the trust, and
if he fails to make inquiry about the title he is getting, it is his own
fault, and he must suffer the consequences of his own neglect.
The general doctrine is stated in Story's Eq. Juris., sect. 400,
where it is said, "for whatever is sufficient to put a party upon
inquiry (that is, whatever has a reasonable certaiuty as to time,
place, circumstances and persons) is in equity held to be good
notice to bind him." A large number of authorities is referred to
in the note, and it is unnecessary to allude to them more particularly.
In the case of the present note it can not be read understandingly
without seeing upon its face that it is connected with a trust and is
part of a trust fund. It was the duty of the bank, before purchasing it, to have made inquiry into the right of the trustee to
dispose of it. But this it wholly failed to do, and as it turns out
he was disposing of the note in fraud of his trust, the bank must
suffer the consequences of the risk it assumed.
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In the case of ,Shaw v. Spencer, 100 Mass. 882, the ques.
tion is considered whether the addition of the word trustee to
the name is alone sufficient to indicate a trust and put a party upon
inquiry. That was the case of stock certificates which were pledged
by the holder as collaterals for certain acceptances. The certificates in question were in the name of E. Carter, trustee. They
were by him endorsed. One of the questions presented was
whether the word trustee was sufficient to put the holders upon
inquiry and thereby affect them with notice of the trust.
The court says on page 393, "The rules of law are presumed to
be known by all men, and they must govern themselves accordingly.
The law holds that the insertion of the word trustee after the name
of a stockholder does indicate and give notice of a trust. No one
is at liberty to disregard such notice and to abstain from inquiry,
for the reason that a trust is frequently simulated or pretended
when it really does not exist. The whole force of this offer of
evidence is addressed to the question whether the word trustee
alone has any significance and does amount to notice of the existence of a trust. But this has heretofore been decided, and is no
longer an open question in this commonwealth." And upon the
ground that the pledgees took the certificates with this notice of
the trust, it was held that they could not retain them against the
equitable owner, inasmuch as Carter, the trustee, had no authority
to use or dispose of them for any such purpose.
The argument that-the bank should not be deprived of its action
against J. Regester & Sons, whose endorsement it is claimed
guarantees the preceding endorser, would be entitled to weight but
for'the facts of the case. While the rule is undoubted that a subsequent endorser guarantees preceding endorsements, it cannot
apply to a case where in fact there was no previous endorsement at
the time of the alleged second endorsement. The obligation of J.
Regester & Sons upon this note were those of original makers,
Ives v. Bosley, 35 Md. 263; Good v. Martin (Supreme Court of
the United States) 17 Am. Law Rep. N. S. 111; as is clearly
shown by the proof in the case. Their name was placed upon the
note as security, and they cannot be held to a contract of guaranty
into which they never entered. That parol evidence is admissible
to show the character in which thev stand relative to this note is
settled by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Good v. Martin, just referred to.
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We are, therefore, very clearly of opinion that the bank cannot
nold Regester & Sons liable as guarantors; when the note is paid
their liability ceases.
We find no error in the decree of the court below, and it will be
affirmed.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
JAMES L. HENDERSON v. CITY OF COVINGTON.
Municipal corporations are delegates of the sovereign for certain purposes of
governmental character, and the powers delegated will always be strictly construed
with reference to the intention of the grant.
The municipal authorities, therefore, have no power to appropriate the revenues
of a city except to the discharge of some duty imposed by law, or to accomplish
some object for which the corporation was created.
A city cannot appropriate money to pay the expenses of persons to visit the
state capital and procure legislation enlarging its corporate powers, even though it
be conceded that such additional powers would be for the general benefit of the city.

THE City Council of Covington, desiring to procure legislative
authority to the city to build a bridge over the Ohio river, and also
desiring some additional legislation by Congress in aid of the project, procured certain persons to visit Frankfort, and advocate before committees of the General Assembly the passage of the desired
state legislation; and others to visit the Federal capital and procured the necessary congressional action.
Afterward the city council passed a resolution appropriating out.
of the revenues of the city the sum of $186, to pay the expenses
incurred by these gentlemen in going to Frankfort and Washington city.
The appellants, who are citizens and taxpayers of the city of
Covington, brought this suit to enjoin the city officials from paying
the money in accordance with the resolution of the council. The
court below sustained a demurrer to the petition.
&tevenson & O'Hfara and J. NA.Furber,for appellants.
W. W. Cleary, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CoPER, J.-The city council is authorized to levy and collect
taxes-not, however, to exceed a designated amount on each $100
worth of taxable property; but the charter does not, and indeed
could not, consistently enumerate the purposes to which the revVOL. xxVII.-49
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enues of the cities shall or may be appropriated; and whether the
appropriation in question here was authorized must be determined
by an inquiry into the nature of municipal corporations, and the
objects for which they are created.
They are agencies of the sovereign to whom certain powers are
delegated, because they can be safely confided to and can be more
intelligently and advantageously exercised by a local magistracy
than by the sovereign authority in the state; but as the powers
delegated are sovereign powers, the instrument by which they are
delegated will always be strictly construed, so that only such as
were clearly intended will be regarded as having been granted.
Such corporations "can exercise no powers but those which are
conferred upon them by the act by which they are constituted, or
such as are necessary to the exercise of their corporate powers, the
performance of their corporate duties, and the accomplishment of
the purposes of their association :" Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick.
71 ; and authorities cited in note 1, sect. 55, Dillon on Municipal
Corporations.
The construction of a bridge across the Ohio river to connect the
city of Covington with the neighboring city of Cincinnati, in the
state of Ohio, was uot, under the charter as it then existed, a part
of the duty of the city council of Covington, nor was the legislation
sought by the council necessary to enable it to perform its corporate duties, or to accomplish the purposes for which the corporation
was created. True, such an enterprise might be of very great
advantage to the city, by inviting population, enhancing the value
of real estate, and in many other ways.
The same might be said of the establishment of a line of ferry
boats to ply between Covington and Cincinnati, of a line of
packets to ply between Covington and New Orleans, Louisville, or
Pittsburgh, and of a railroad connecting with any of the large cities
on the Atlantic sea-board; and if the city council might lawfully
appropriate the revenues of the city to procure legislation to
authorize it to build a bridge over the Ohio, because such a bridge
would benefit the city,* it might, upon the same ground, make
appropriations to secure legislative authority to accomplish the
other enterprises to which we have referred, and corporate expenditures might thus be increased indefinitely.
With the question whether their corporate powers should be
enlarged, the corporate authorities, as such, had no concern. Their
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duties and powers were ascertained and fixed by the legislature
which created the corporation to exercise the powers granted, and
perform the duties imposed; and the city council have no authority
to appropriate any of the revenues of the city, except to enable it
to discharge some duty imposed by law, or to accomplish some
object for which the corporation was created: Stetson v. -emper,
18 Mass. 271.
The members of the city council, in their capacity of citizens,
had a right to apply to the legislature to enlarge the powers of the
corporation; but it would be dangerous in the extreme to hold that
they might employ the power already granted and the money
belonging to the city to obtain through persons sent by them to
appear before the General Assembly, an increase of the powers of
the corporation. If the authorities of cities and towns may, at
their discretion, use the corporate revenue to procure such legislation as they may deem to the interest of their municipalities, the
worst consequences may be apprehended. Such a practice would
inevitably lead to abuses; and the history of municipal corporations
in this country during the last quarter of a century, gives ample
warning of the danger of relaxing the well-established rule that
municipal charters are to be strictly construed, and the powers of
corporate authorities confined to such as are granted in express
words, or are necessarily and fairly implied, or are essential to the
objects of their creation.
The amount involved here, and the nature of the additional
powers sought by the city council, are sufficient to repel any suspicion of improper motives on the part of its members, and we are
glad of an.opportunity to declare the law of this subject in a case
which, while it will serve all the purposes of a safe precedent,
leaves unsullied the official and personal character and integrity
of the functionaries whose act, we feel compelled, by principle,
authority, and an obvious public policy, to declare illegal.
We might cite many adjudications to sustain this conclusion,
but deem it unnecessary. The principle we have applied has
become elementary in this country and in England, and.when corporations are being multiplied, and their powers enlarged at each
succeeding session of the General Assembly, and when corporate
debts are being created at a rate exceeding the growth of the country
in wealth and population, every enlightened person, lay or professional, must see the absolute necessity for a firm adherence to the

